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1 INTRODUCTION
The background to this article lies in the historic
shifts taking place in the global economy and their
wide ranging social and political implications. The
process of regionalization and the formation of
linked but contending North American, West Euro-
pean and East Asian economic blocs are very impor-
tant. There is a lurking fear that these developments
are having the unintended effect of locking out and
marginalizing nonbloc areas of the world (Oman
1994). In parts of Africa, the Middle East, East
Europe and the former Soviet Union, a systemic
economic crisis has emerged which has rolled back
the modest development gains of past decades
(Sideri 1993). Income disparities between the richest
and poorest countries have grown ever wider
(UNDP 199). Consequently the number of interna;
tional economic migrants has steadily increased to an
estimated 60 million today (Pellerin 1993). Myrdal's
(1957) dictum of 'circular and cumulative causation'
where growth in one area is synonymous with the
decline of another is back on the agenda.
It is important to note, however, political instability
has also become an entrenched part of the global
scene. A stark indicator of this trend has been the
steady rise in the number of ongoing wars: from
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10 in 1960 to around 50 today (Gantzel 1994). Each
year more have started than have ended and wars
are also lasting longer. It is significant that the
increase is mainly due to the burgeoning number of
internal as opposed to interstate wars. The level and
spread of insecurity are unprecedented in modem
times. There are now around 20 million refugees
globally with similar numbers of internally displaced
people (Welsh 1993).
Political instability has also changed its geographi-
cal centre of gravity. It has begun to reflect the
process of regionalization. Following the end of the
Cold War, political tensions have decreased in East
Asia and Latin America. In contrast, they have
tended to concentrate and scale new heights in
parts of Africa, the Middle East, East Europe, the
Caucasus and Central Asia (Suhrke 1993). In 1993,
for example, there were 26 UN-designated 'complex
emergencies' affecting 59 million people (UN 1993).
Apart from Haiti, it is significant that all were in
the Africa-Eurasia zone.
As external causes have ceased to explain, the
character of internal war has also begun to change.
The previous, ideologically driven nationalist or so-
cialist wars of liberation have been superseded
Figure 1: Ongoing wars, 1945-1992
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Emerging in their place are resource wars that lack
a clear social programme (Duffield 1991). In response
to systemic crisis, proactive and nonconventional
socio-economic formations have emerged. These are
often ethnically structured and of a predatory or
fundamentalist nature. Rather than a temporary
occurrence, violence has become an important ad-
junct of economic and political survival in land-
scapes increasingly lacking alternatives (Keen 1994).
More recent has been the emergence of ethno-nation-
alism and internal war within and on the periphery
of the former Soviet empire (Schierup 1993). In the
past, political violence was usually linked to a
process of state formation. Some commentators now
argue that the world has entered a phase of insecurity
associated with state disintegration (Kaldor 1993;
Suhrke 1993).
The UN and the international aid apparatus were
shaped in a more certain world. They are now
strained to the limit in the face of new complex
emergencies, characterized by unprecedented levels
of abject poverty, political insecurity, conflict, state
disintegration and population displacement.
2 COMPLEX EMERGENCIES AND THE CRISIS
OF DEVELOPMENTALISM
Complex emergencies challenge conventional views
on development. Developmentalism rests on the
assumption of the universality of social progress
(Norgaard 1994). Development is a normative proc-
ess of becoming: a series of interconnecting move-
ments leading from poverty and vulnerability to
security and well-being. It is part of the myth of
modernity. That is, the certainty that shared
progress is the normal and long-term direction
of all social change. For several decades, the
modernist paradigm has dominated the interna-
tional aid apparatus. Simultaneously, however, this
apparatus has been powerless and uncomprehending
in the face of growing systemic crisis and political
fragmentation, a trend that is the antithesis of
the developmental world-view. The stage has now
been reached where transcending the developmen-
tal crisis is the main challenge for progressive
aid policy. Understanding complex emergencies is
central to this task.
The term complex emergency emerged in Africa in
the late 1980s. It gained wider currency with the
Gulf War. For the UN, a complex emergency is a
major humanitarian crisis of a multi-causal nature
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that requires a system-wide response. Commonly,
a long-term combination of political, conflict and
peacekeeping factors is also involved (UN 1993: 23).
Apart from a new peacekeeping element, this is not
an original or apt conception. In many respects, the
multi-causal model has become interchangeable
with an earlier category of man-made emergency.
Both multi-causal and man-made emergencies are
usually defined in opposition to implicitly mono-
causal natural disasters.
Despite this attempted contrast, the multicausal
definition of a complex emergency does not effec-
tively distinguish it from a natural disaster. It has
long been recognized that even natural disasters,
such as droughts or floods, are themselves complex
social and ecological phenomena (Kent 1987). So-
called complex emergencies are essentially political
in nature: they are protracted political crises result-
ing from sectarian or predatory indigenous responses
to socioeconomic stress and marginalization. Unlike
natural disasters, complex emergencies have a singu-
lar ability to erode or destroy the cultural, civil,
political and economic integrity of established
societies. They attack social systems and net-
works. Humanitarian assistance itself can be-
come a target of violence and appropriation
by political actors who are organic parts of the
crisis. Complex emergencies are internal to political
and economic structures. They are different from
natural disasters and deserve to be understood and
responded to as such.
3 THE LIMITED NATURE OF RELIEF ACTIVITY
The international relief apparatus has also failed
operationally to distinguish complex emergencies
from natural disasters. For example, the relief pro-
grammes in Angola and Somalia usually concentrate
on the delivery of basic survival commodities and
services. Despite being political emergencies, such
programmes have their operational origins in the
response to floods and droughts. That a degree of
military protection for the delivery system exists in a
few places does not invalidate this point. Moreover,
there are big differences between what could be
called weak and strong state crises in Africa and the
Balkans respectively. Despite this, humanitarian
relief programmes in these two regions have also
assumed similar organizational forms (Duffield
1994a). The logic of relief activity derives from a
natural disaster model that pays little attention to
social or political factors.
Figure 2: Global disaster relief as a proportion of global ODA
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It is common to regard this one-dimensional hu-
manitarian response to political crisis as a problem
of relief policy. This is tantamount to seeing relief
and development as essentially separate practices. A
cursory examination reveals this not to be the case.
Relief is a developmentalist concept. Analytically
and institutionally development has always been the
dominant of the pair. Developmentalism is incapa-
ble of understanding political crisis as anything but
a short-term or abnormal occurrence. Despite the
increasing number of internal wars and their grow-
ing longevity, even conflict is still regarded as a
transitory setback. In consequence, relief has been
forced into a series of temporary administrative,
personnel and financial compromises: the spurious
image of the external natural disaster has been pressed
to provide a template for all relief situations, even
social collapse and political violence.
4 THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF AID FLOW
One notable effect of the collapse of the Cold War
has been the decline in strategic importance of
the West's former Third World allies (Griffin 1991).
Partly as a result, even before the end of the 1980s,
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total development aid had begun to stagnate
and decline. Reflecting the systemic crisis, however,
the reverse is the case with emergency spending
(Borton 1993). This has been increasing noticeably
since the 1980s. UN agency, EU, bilateral donor
and NGO budgets graphically illustrate this point.
For Britain's Overseas Development Administration,
for example, the proportion of its aid budget spent
on relief has increased from 2 per cent in the early
1980s to 11 per cent in 1991-92. Similar figures for
UNICEF are from 7 per cent in 1987 to 23 per cent
in 1993 (UNICEF, nd). EU's spending on external
humanitarian relief increased more than five
times between 1990 and 1993, that is, from 114.3
million to 605 million ECUs (European Commission
1994).
General figures are more difficult to come by
(Borton 1993). A probable underestimate is that
around $4 billion, or about 7 per cent of total
overseas development assistance (ODA) is spent
on relief expenditure (Figure 2). One also has to
bear in mind the escalating cost of UN peacekeep-
ing. This is $3.2 billion a year and rising (Elliot
1994).
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Following the stagnation of development assistance,
there is a concern that increased expenditure on relief
is at the expense of development. Within complex
emergencies, however, the global trend usually
presents itself as a complete substitution. In many
parts of Africa, for example, development budgets
have collapsed and humanitarian assistance is the
only substantial aid being received. Importantly, the
substitution of relief exenditure represents both a
quantitative and qualitative decline in the character
of aid. Although global relief expenditure is rising,
there is marked underfunding of individual pro-
grammes and growing competition between emer-
gencies (Keen 1992). Furthermore, despite the com-
prehensive physical, institutional and social destruc-
tion that can result from a protracted political crisis,
food aid remains the main response.
5 ACTUAL RELIEF VERSUS HYPOTHETICAL
DEVELOPMENT
One effect of the systemic crisis is the growing inter-
est in 'linking relief and development', 'relief-devel-
opment strategies', or 'relief to development con-
tinuum' ideas (Ross, et al. 1994). An important fea-
ture of what can be called the linking debate is that by
a process of inversion, rather than the modernist
paradigm, it is relief that is usually cast as needing
reform. In relation to UNDP's advocacy of a develop-
ment continuum, for example, emergencies are seen
from a modernist perspective, that is, as temporary
interruptions to the process of linear development
(UNDP 1994). However, because of increased hu-
manitarian expenditure, there is a concern that relief
itself is becoming a threat to social progress:
If conceptualized, planned and implemented
in isolation [relief] will replace development
and breed long-term dependencies, undermine
indigenous coping strategies and increase
vulnerabilities.
(UNDP 1994:1)
UNDP has missed the wood for the trees. It is not
relief practice per se that is the problem but the
systemic crisis that it ineffectively addresses.
The linking debate is primarily an argument over
resources, a defensive move by an institutional
interest which fears for the object of its existence:
stable societies that can sustain socioeconomic
improvement. The shift in aid flow toward emer-
gency spending has accentuated this crisis.
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Developmentalists have been forcd to argue
their centrality in a space that, in the past, was
willingly abandoned to relief. Three decades ago,
many now crisis-ridden countries had a functioning
civil and social administration, a transport system
and a modest, but real, economy. If they were not
able to achieve sustainable development then, it
is questionable if it is possible now given, the loss
of these advantages.
There are two conceptual difficulties with the linking
debate. First, it is unable to come to terms with the
reality of permanent emergency. Waiting for a new
dawn of resumed development is hampering re-
search and practical action which needs to be taken
now. The simplistic treatment of conflict as an irra-
tional occurrence, as the antithesis of develop-
ment, is a case in point. Consequently, self-sustain-
ing war economies remain little understood. Second,
since relief work has never been taken seriously,
the extent to which donor policy has already effected
a de facto accommodation with permanent emer-
gency has largely been missed. Instead of trying
to link relief to a hypothetical state of develop-
ment, it is better to examine this actually existing
accommodation.
6 ACCOMMODATION WITH PERMANENT
EMERGENCY
The accommodation with protracted crisis is a con-
tradictory structure. At one level the aid apparatus
has been plunged into a period of unprecedented
institutional change and policy flux. Complex emer-
gencies have become a forcing house of changing
North-South relations. Simultaneously, however,
they have elicited a limited relief response. The
quality of aid has been reduced, the pattern of inter-
vention is uneven, military humanitarianism has a
dismal history, and so on. This suggests that
appeasing Northern constituencies rather than
tackling the crisis may be the main impact of
so-called humanitarian intervention.
The systemic crisis and the substitution of relief for
development leads to the following proposition.
Despite the short-term nature of relief activity and its
origins in natural disaster, it has come to play an
unexpected role in North-South relations. In the
post-Cold War era, humanitarian aid is the North's
principal means of political crisis management in a
now marginal South.
Initial attempts to analyse the accommodation with
permanent emergency argued the historic impor-
tance of the formation of donor,NGO safety-nets
during the latter part of the 1980s (Duffield 1992).
The following is a brief but more comprehensive
appraisal.
6.1 The Cold War era: neutrality and the
acceptance of conflict
The period between Biafra in the late 1960s and
Ethiopia in the mid 1980s was an important phase of
development. During this time, the UN was con-
strained by sovereignty and limited by its mandate to
working with recognized governments. In cases of
internal war, except for the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, this often meant that the
humanitarian needs of peoples in contested areas
were not met.
Some NGOs attempted to fill the humanitarian
deficit in contested areas. Typically, new NGOs or-
NGO consortia, often church based, emerged in rela-
tion to controversial cross-border or cross-line
type programmes (Davis 1975). The illicit nature of
these activities reinforced an earlier tradition that
humanitarian relief must be neutral, that is, eschew
politics and only provide externally monitored,
basic relief items (Duffield and Prendergast 1994). To
have engaged in wider development activities could
have been construed as political solidarity. It would
have compounded the problem of legitimacy at a
time when sovereignty was paramount. While de-
ploring conflict, concerned NGOs had little choice
but to take the historic step of developing
nonmandated programmes in war situations. In
contrast, during the Cold War, the UN seldom
intervened in a political crisis without an agreed
cease-fire (Goulding 1993).
6.2 The mid 1980s: donor/NGO sub-contracting
In Africa, the Cold War was all but over by the mid
1980s (Clough 1992). This ushered in a period of
formative development. A historic shift of donor
funding away from states saw a general expansion of
NGO involvement in relief work (Borton 1993).
Changing donor policy meant that previously illicit
cross-border operations gained de facto recognition
at the expense of nation-state sovereignty. The en-
hanced humanitarian role of NGOs was synony-
mous with the increasing development of
nonmandated donor/NGO subcontracting relations
(Korten 1990). From the Horn, safety-net systems
spread to protracted crises in other parts of Africa. By
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the end of the 1980s, the position of NGOs as relief
implementors was well established. For most of this
period, internal contractual relations were usually of
an ad hoc or informal nature (Duffield 1992). The
idea of NGO flexibility owes much to this phase.
6.3 The late 1 980s: negotiated access
At the close of the 1980s, there emerged the first UN
mandated cross-border or cross-line type operations.
South Sudan, Ethiopia and Angola are examples
(Minear 1991; Duffield 1994a). Sometimes known as
'corridors of peace', these programmes mark a his-
toric turning point for the UN. Following the path of
independent NGOs, it too accepted the need to work
in unresolved conflict situations (Higgins 1993).
Post-Cold War euphoria and the belief that humani-
tarian assistance could itself promote peace helped
this transformation (UNICEF 1991).
The basis of these operations was negotiated access.
That is, the UN securing the agreement of warring
parties to the movement of neutral humanitarian
aid. Negotiated access programmes also saw the
beginnings of the UN's integrated approach to com-
plex emergencies. That is, establishing a formal
division of labour between the UN specialist
agencies according to their traditional roles with one
taking a coordinating lead.
The new demands thrust upon the UN helped
expose the lack of implementation capacity within
its specialist agencies. Therefore, negotiated access
programmes also created the outline of a new UNI
NGO relationship. The UN would secure access,
funds and provide coordination while NGOs would
carry out the actual relief programmes. Compared to
earlier donor/NGO subcontracting, the new UNI
NGO safety-net exemplified the trend towards
more formal contracts and instruments of affiliation.
By mandating previously illicit cross-border type
operations, negotiated access represented a further
erosion of sovereignty. Such programmes also
radically changed the operational equation for
NGOs. The choice became whether to join an UN
integrated programme or remain outside. Some
NGOs, such as MSF(F) and the large American
agencies, often decided to operate independently of
integrated programmes. Importantly, the continua-
tion of ICRC and donor/NGO safety-nets along-
side emergent UN negotiated access operations,
represented an increase in policy instruments
available to donors.
6.4 The Gulf War: military humanitarianism and
donor agencies
Rather than pushing accommodation in a new direc-
tion, the Gulf War built on earlier trends. Impor-
tantly, it threw the limitations of the existing inter-
face into contrast. UN agencies and NGOs did
badly in the humanitarian crisis arising from the
conflict (UN 1991). Moreover, the specific conditions
of the war had shown the limitations of negotiated
access. The principle of using military personnel to
protect a UN mandated relief operation was estab-
lished (Roberts 1993). Following Kurdistan, ad hoc
variants have appeared in Bosnia, Somalia and
Rwanda. Importantly, however, in relation to the
first two, protection has often also incorporated a
policy of internalising or containing refugee flows
(Douglas Stafford 1993).
Of equal significance were UN agency and donor
developments. Concerning improving coordination
within UN integrated programmes, in 1992 the De-
partment of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) was estab-
lished. The DHA has restated the centrality of the
UN/NGO relation. Through consolidated appeals,
it has also attempted to put emergency funding on a
more secure base. As for donors, the EU and some
bilateral governments were persuaded to establish
their own operational emergency capacity. This
was a result of both the poor performance of NGOs
and the increasing donor time and expenditure
devoted to relief (Pooley 1991). Apart from the
EU, several governments, including the UK's, have
become humanitarian agents (ODA, 1991).
6.5 The current period: the normalization of
violence
Military humanitarianism has already begun to
wane. The immense political difficulties encoun-
tered in Bosnia and Somalia has prompted caution.
Rather than a blue print for a New World Order,
it is probable that military protection for hu-
manitarian programmes will remain exceptional.
Protection, however, is not an intrinsic feature of
the accommodation. A trend of greater significance
has been a continuing operational evolution of UN
negotiated access.
Post-Cold War optimism has disappeared. Within
UN negotiated access operations, the emphasis has
been on further separating politics from humanitar-
ian relief. The chief policy instrument for this has
been the development of formal rule-based physi-
cal security and delivery systems. NGOs affiliate
42
based on agreed neutrality and codes of conduct.
The operational core of negotiated access is the collec-
tive UN/NGO distribution plan. Such plans are usu-
ally drawn up on a weekly of monthly basis by the
lead UN agency. They are cleared in advance with
the warring parties and aid is delivered according
to set times and corridors. This type of formal
system is presently running in Angola, Bosnia and
South Sudan (Duffield 1994b). Whilehavingmilitary
protection and the internalization of displacement as
appendages, Bosnia, for example, is essentially a
negotiated access programme.
Compared to the late 1980s, mandated negotiated
access is now more sophisticated. One consequence
is that humanitarian assistance has become closely
integrated with the dynamics of violence. It is in-
creasingly common for UN integrated programmes,
even NGOs, to employ ex-military personnel as
security advisors. In many complex emergencies
the infrastructure now exists for aid to ebb and
flow with the level of fighting. This is an unprec-
edented situation.
Ordered war economies have given way to more
fragmented patterns of violence and asset stripping.
For many movements and factions, the control and
manipulation of relief assistance has become an im-
portant aspect of the political economy of conflict
(Scott-Villiers 1993). Local power relations have
been altered and new ones fostered. It has placed
aid workers in positions of great risk and uncer-
tainty (Jean 1993). More have been killed in the
past couple of years than in the preceding decade.
7 KEY ASPECTS OF THE ACCOMMODATION
Negotiated access is the main response to unre-
solved conflict in the South. This accommodation
has produced an unprecedented integration of so-
called neutral humanitarian assistance with the
dynamics of violence. There are several intercon-
nected trends.
The North has become conditioned to increasing
levels of dislocation and political violence in the
South. Independent NGOs initially forged the prin-
ciple of nonmandated humanitarian work in ongo-
ing conflict. This was later given a major boost by
donor governments in the mid 1980s at the expense of
nation-state sovereignty. By the beginning of the
1990s, the UN had also accepted the necessity of
working in unresolved political crisis. One result of
this institutional accommodation is that today's 50
or so ongoing wars, rather than being seen as
unprecedented, are experienced as somehow
normal. To gain attention at all, political crises have
to plumb ever increasing depths of breakdown or
barbarity.
While systemic crisis has become normalized, the
number of policy instruments available to donors
has increased. Donor governments now have the
choice, for example, of either working through the
ICRC, independent NGOs or NGO consortia, inte-
grated UN operations, or even becoming operational
themselves. In other words, they have found signifi-
cant operational and political flexibility at a time
when total aid budgets are declining. If any develop-
ment gains have been achieved, they are here.
Tragically, however, as Bosnia has shown, donor
flexibility has contributed to the erosion of ideas of
collective international responsibility for the South-
ern predicament. The UN Charter and Geneva
Conventions have been weakened (Childers 1993).
In their place narrow perceptions of national in-
terest, or calculations based on media exposure or
domestic political advantage have become the
arbiters of engagement.
Flexibility, and the consequent erosion of collective
responsibility in international relations, has been
helped by the emergence of a private and competitive
NGO sector (Borton 1994). NGO financial and
media dependency, plus their ability to work in a
variety of situations, has been important in allowing
donor governments to shape humanitarian pro-
grammes around national interests, a major change
that many NGOs appear unable to contemplate
let alone accept.
8 CONCLUSION
Rather than a debatable resumption of sustainable
development, more realistically the structure of ac-
commodation will continue to evolve and consoli-
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